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We show an improved ping − pong protocol which is based on the protocol showed by Kim
Bostrom and Timo Felbinger [Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 187902 (2002)]. We show that our protocol is
asymptotically secure key distribution and quasisecure direct communication using a mixed state.
This protocol can be carried out with great efficiency and speed with today’s technology, e.g. single
photon source and linear optical elements technology.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.65.-a
Quantum key distribution is a brilliant application of quantum mechanics. We consider that quantum channel is
secure because quantum physics establishes a set of negative rules stating things that cannot be done: (1) One cannot
take a measurement without perturbing the system. (2) One cannot determine simultaneously the position and the
momentum of a particle with arbitrarily high accuracy. (3) One cannot simultaneously measure the polarization of
a photon in the vertical-horizontal basis and simultaneously in the diagonal basis. (4) One cannot draw pictures of
individual quantum processes. (5) One cannot duplicate an unknown quantum state. These characters of quantum
physics let us have ability to exchange information securely. The motive that we build quantum-mechanical commu-
nications channels is not only to transmit information securely without being eavesdropped on but also to transmit
information more efficiently.
In the Bennett-brassard (BB84) protocol [1], Alice send a key qubit to Bob, which is prepared in one of two
conjugate bases. Bob measures the qubit in one of the two base. The eavesdropper Eve does not know the basis
choose by Alice, so she cannot obtain information about the key without a detectable disturbance. But this type
of cryptographic schemes are usually nondeterministic [2,3]. A secure direct communication has been presented in
reference [4], which allows encoding only after a final transmission of classical information. Recently, K. Bostrom and
T. Felbinger presented a ping− pong protocol, which allows for deterministic communication using entanglement [5].
In this paper, we will give an improved ping − pong protocol using single photon in the mixed states.
It is well known that we can prepare a photon in states {|0 >, |1 >} or {|ϕ0 >, |ϕ1 >}in its polarization degree of
freedom, where
|ϕ0 > = 1√
2
(|0 > +|1 >), (1)
|ϕ1 > = 1√
2
(|0 > −|1 >). (2)
Denote that iσy = |0 >< 1| − |1 >< 0|, it can be obtained:
iσy|0 >= −|1 >, iσy|1 >= |0 > (3)
and
iσy|ϕ0 >= |ϕ1 >, iσy|ϕ1 >= −|ϕ0 > . (4)
Suppose Alice want to obtain some classical information. First she sends a photon which is prepared in a mixed states
|ψ >:
ρ = |ψ >< ψ| = 1
2
|0 >< 0|+ 1
2
|ϕ0 >< ϕ0| (5)
to Bob. That is, Alice selects state |0 > or |ϕ+ > randomly with the probability p = 1
2
every time. Bob decides
either to perform the operation iσy on the travel qubit to encode the information ’1’ or do nothing, i.e., to perform
the operation I to encode the information ’0’. Then Bob sends the travel qubit back to Alice. Alice performs a
measurement on this back photon to draw the information Bob encoded. This is a ping − pong protocol [5]. In this
protocol, there are two communication modes, ’message mode’ and ’control mode’ (see Figs.1 and 2.). By default,
Bob and Alice are in message mode. The communication is described above. With probability c, Bob switches the
message mode to control mode. After Bob obtained a photon, instead of performing his operation on the travel qubit,
Bob use the public channel to exchanges information about the basis Alice used. Then Bob performs a measurement in
1
the basis B0 = {|0 >, |1 >} or B1 = {|ϕ0 >, |ϕ1 >} decided by the information Alice told. Bob sends the measurement
result to Alice. If Alice find the result is the same as she prepared, she let the communication continue. Else, there
is an Eve in line. The communication stops! This protocol can be described explicitly like this:
1) Alice prepares a photon in the state |0 > or |ϕ0 > with a probability p = 12 .
2) Alice sends the photon to Bob.
3) Bob receives the travel photon. He decides to the message mode or the control mode randomly.
4c) Control mode. Bob exchanges two bits information with Alice through public channel. Suppose the photon was
prepared in state |0 >, but Bob finds that the measurement result is in the state |1 > (Or Alice prepared the photon
in the state |ϕ0 >. However, Bob finds the photon in the state |ϕ1 >). There is an Eve in line. The communication
stops. Else, this communication continues (Goto 1).).
4m) Message mode. Bob performs an operation to encode classical information on the photon. He encodes the
information ’0’ by the operation I, and the information ’1’ by the operation iσy. Then Bob sends the photon back to
Alice. Alice obtains the classical information encoded by Bob with a measurement in the basis it has been prepared.
This communication continues (Goto 1). ).
5) When all of Bob’s information transmitted, this communication stops.
We will show that this protocol is secure below.
Eve is an evil quantum physicist able to build all devices that are allowed by the laws of quantum mechanics.
Her aim is to find out which operation Alice performs (See Fig.3.). First, we will show that Eve can not get full
information about the states |ψ > that Alice prepared. Here we will use a very famous theorem, the Holevo theorem
[6,7]. It states that: Suppose Alice prepares a state ρi where i = 0, ..., n with a probabilities p0, ..., pn. Eve performs
a measurement described by POVM elements {Ej} = {E0, ..., Em} on the state, with measurement outcome E. The
Holevo theorem states that for any such measurement Eve may do:
H(A : E) ≤ S(ρ)−
∑
i
piS(ρi), (6)
where
ρ =
∑
i
piρi. (7)
S(ρ) is the Von Neumann entropy. The mutual information H(A:E) of A and E measures how much information A
and E have in common. It is a good measure of how much information has been gained about A (Alice) from the
measurement outcome E (Eve). We denote
χ = S(ρ)−
∑
i
piS(ρi). (8)
The Holevo chi quantity is the upper bound on the accessible information. We will prove that
χ(ρ) < H(A), (9)
where H(A) is Shannon entropy as a function of a probability distribution. The binary entropy H(A) is [8]:
H(A) = −p log p− (1− p) log(1− p). (10)
Since either of the mixed states is prepared with equal probability p = 1
2
, then we have
H(A) = 1. (11)
The upper bound on the accessible information Eve can gain about the mixed states is χ. The von Neumann entropy
is defined by [8]
S(ρ) = −tr(ρ log ρ). (12)
The matrix of the density operator in the basis {|0 >, |1 >} is
ρ = |ψ >< ψ| =
[
3
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
]
. (13)
We can calculate the eigenvalues λ of ρ:
2
λ1,2 =
1
2
±
√
2
4
.
Then von Neumann’s definition of entropy (10) can be re-expressed
S(ρ) = −λ1 log λ1 − λ2 logλ2. (14)
And the von Neumann entropy is zero for a pure state. So we have
χ = S(ρ)−
∑
i
piS(ρi) < H(A), (15)
which means the law of quantum mechanics forbids Eve to gain full information about the states ρ which Alice
prepared. Therefore, Eve is not sure which state Alice prepared.
To find out which operation Bob performs, Eve would use all methods that quantum mechanics laws allowed. The
most general quantum operation is a completely positive map
ε : S(HA)→ S(HA) (16)
Because of the Stinespring dilation theorem [9], and completely positive map can be realized by a unitary operation
on a larger Hilbert space. If the HA has a Hilbert space of d dimensions, then it suffices to model the ancilla space HE
as being in a Hilbert space of no more than d2 dimensions. With an ancilla state |e >∈ HE , and a unitary operation
U on HA ⊗HE , for all ρA ∈ HA, we have
ε(ρA) = TrE [U(ρA ⊗ |e >< e|)U †]. (17)
In order to gain information about Bob’s operation, Eve should first perform the unitary attack operation U on the
composed system, then let Bob perform his coding operation on the travel photon, and finally perform a measurement.
No measurement implies that Eve did not get any information about the travel photon.
Because the photon is in mixed states, to Eve, the travel photon is prepared in a state either |0 > or |ϕ0 > with a
probability p = 1
2
. First, let us suppose the travel photon is in the state |ϕ0 >. Because Eve’s purpose is to find out
which operation Bob performs, she adds an ancilla in the state |e > and performs the unitary operation U on both
systems, resulting in
|ψ′ >= U |ϕ0, e >= α|ϕ0, e0 > +β|ϕ1, e1 >, (18)
where |e0 >, |e1 > are pure ancilla states uniquely determined by U , and |α|2 + |β|2 = 1. Randomly, Bob selects the
control mode and turns on the public channel. If Eve does not exist, the result of Bob’s measurement will always in
the state |ϕ0 >. With Eve in line, the detection probability for Eve’s attack in a control mode is
d = |β|2 = 1− |α|2. (19)
Without control mode, after Eve’s attack operation, the state of the system becomes
ρ′ = |ψ′ >< ψ′|, (20)
which can be written in the orthogonal basis {|ϕ0, e0 >, |ϕ1, e1 >} as
ρ′ =
[ |α|2 αβ∗
α∗β |β|2
]
. (21)
Bob encodes his one bit by applying the operation I or iσy to the travel photon with the respective probability p0
and p1. Then, the state of the qubit photon becomes
ρ′′ =
[ |α|2 αβ∗(p0 − p1)
α∗β(p0 − p1) |β|2
]
. (22)
The maximal information Eve can gain is decided by the von Neumann entropy, S(ρ′′), described by Eq.(12). We can
calculate the eigenvalues λ of ρ′′:
λ1,2 =
1
2
± 1
2
√
1− (4d− 4d2)[1 − (p0 − p1)2]. (23)
3
When p0 = p1, the maximal information Eve can gain is surprising equal to the Shannon entry of a binary channel,
I(d) = Hbin(d) = −d log d− (1− d) log(1 − d), (24)
which is concavity for any d range 0 to 1 [8]. The function I(d) has a maximum at d = 1/2. It is a monotonous
function 0 ≤ d(I) ≤ 1/2, I(d) ∈ [0, 1]. When the information Eve gains I(d) > 0, the detection probability is d(I) > 0.
If Eve want to gain full information about Bob’s operation, the detection probability is d(I) = 1/2. Assume that
Alice sends state |0 > rather than |ϕ0 >, the same result we can gain [5].
Suppose the probability of control mode in every protocol run is c. The effective transmission rate is 1 − c. The
asymptotic probability after n bits transmitted that Eve is not detected becomes
pn = (1− cd) n1−c , (25)
where 0 < c < 1, 0 ≤ d ≤ 1
2
. With the communication running, Eve’s successful detection probability decreases
exponentially.
Summary, in this paper, we give an improved ping − pong protocol. Comparing with the ping − pong protocol
showed by Bostrom and Felbinger [5], we use a single photon source instead of an EPR pair source. A stable and
efficient single photon source has been reported [10]. Knill, Laflamme, and Milburn have shown that quantum logical
operation can be performed using linear optical elements and ancilla photons [11]. This secure communication protocol
can be carried out with great efficiency and speed using today’s technology.
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Fig. 2. Control mode.
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Fig. 3. A general eavesdropping attack.
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